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Analyzing and anticipating competitor moves has been central to mod-
ern competitive strategy. In contexts involving intense interﬁrm interac-
tion, the value of a particular strategy depends in large part on how com-
petitors will react to it. Despite many developments, anecdotal evidence
indicates that the eﬀective use of techniques to gauge decisions based on
competitive considerations has been scant in practice. Our paper intends
to ﬁll this void. Using data from the auto insurance industry in Brazil, we
compare strategies that do and do not anticipate competitor reactions.
Basically we show that it does pay to anticipate those reactions. An
optimal strategy will explore both demand elasticities and competitors’
patterns of reaction. We show that such “strategic” policy is expected
to outperform a “myopic” approach which ignores competitor reactions.
We also develop an methodology to compute demand elasticities, reaction
functions and numerically compute optimal reaction strategies.
Acknowledgement 1 We thank the ﬁnancial support by the Center for
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Analyzing and anticipating competitor moves has been central to modern com-
petitive strategy. In contexts involving intense interﬁrm interaction, the value
of a particular strategy depends in large part on how competitors will react to
it. Thus, Porter (1980, p. 72) has proposed the development of a “competitive
intelligence system” aimed at “compiling, cataloging, digesting, and communi-
cating” data about competition. A ﬂurry of research attempting to systematize
the process of collection and analysis of data from competitors has recently
emerged (e.g., Kahaner, 1996; Prescott and Miller, 2002; Warren, 2002). In
1parallel, several authors have sought to apply game-theoretic concepts to the
assessment and prediction of competitor moves (e.g., Brandenburger & Nalebuﬀ,
1996; Ghemawat, 1991; Tirole, 1988). Despite those developments, anecdotal
evidence indicates that the eﬀective use of techniques to gauge decisions based
on competitive considerations has been scant in practice. Bossidy and Charan
(2002, p. 192-193), for instance, report the following case:
“One December I had a call from a CEO of a $5 billion com-
pany... One key division was responsible for the company’s failure
to meet its earnings forecast. The person who was running it [devel-
oped a strategy] to gain market share by cutting prices... He cal-
culated that his increased volume from cutting prices would lower
costs. When the CEO reviewed it, the strategy made sense to him.
We went over all this and ﬁnally I asked, ‘So what did you miss?’
By then the CEO had ﬁgured it out. ‘I did not ask him what the
competitors’ reactions would be,’ he said. The biggest competitor
matched the price cuts almost immediately, and the other followed.
Prices for the entire industry went down... The CEO replaced the
division head, and the new man he brought in gradually rolled the
prices back up [and] competitors followed the price increases...”
This example illustrates that failing to anticipate competitive reactions can
severely undermine the value of certain strategies. Thus, ﬁrms may be able to
improve performance by developing practices to monitor the competition and
act accordingly. Several factors, however, may plague ﬁrms’ ability to eﬀec-
tively beneﬁt from those practices. First, patterns of competitor reaction may
be diﬃcult to predict or may change over time. Second, the development and
maintenance of competitive intelligence systems may be costly. At the most
fundamental level, we need to ask whether ﬁrms can improve their performance
by developing a systematic program to act upon estimates of competitive reac-
tions, and assess the magnitude of such an improvement. Surprisingly, to our
best knowledge, this simple question remains unexplored in the literature on
competitive strategy.
Our paper intends to ﬁll this void. Using data from the auto insurance in-
dustry in Brazil, we assess whether a “reaction” pricing policy, which anticipates
competitor reactions, outperforms a simpler “myopic” policy ignoring such reac-
tions. To do so, in the next section we describe the two pricing policies that can
be followed by our ﬁrm of interest: “myopic” and “strategic”. In section 3 we
present estimates of demand and competitor reactions curves. Those estimates
are then used to compute and compare the two policies in section 4. The last
section presents our ﬁnal conclusions.
2P r i c i n g P o l i c i e s
In this section we develop a pricing algorithm assuming a partial equilibrium
framework for our ﬁrm of interest, denoted Firm 1. The idea is to compare two
2pricing policies: a “myopic” policy, with no anticipation of competitor reactions,
and a “strategic” policy, which considers how competitors might react in the
future. Our pricing policies assume a partial equilibrium framework because we
infer competitors’ reaction from market data rather than a speciﬁc objective
function maximization, for example, maximization of proﬁts or market share..
In the “myopic” policy, a speciﬁc ﬁrm assumes that no ﬁrm can individually
aﬀect prices of other competitors or industry prices. It is a common assumption
of perfect competition markets. The policy is considered a “myopic” policy
because ﬁrm 1 does not look at other ﬁrms’ reactions to its price changes. This
strategy is easy to implement and needs limited information. Basically, ﬁrm 1
only needs the estimation of its own demand curve. Finally, taking competitors’
prices as given would be a very reasonable assumption if the industry is in perfect
competition. That is, if the industry is composed by many small ﬁrms which
cannot aﬀect market prices individually.
The potential drawback of the “myopic” strategy is that ﬁrm 1 and competi-
tors’ size can matter. If the competition is aggressive and market is concentrated
on few players, one ﬁrm may observe and react to price changes of other ﬁrms.
One ﬁrm may try to expand its market share by reducing prices, but if it is fol-
lowed by its competitors, the price change can initiate a price war of decreasing
market prices. The ﬁnal result of this price reduction can be smaller proﬁts and
the same initial market share. The example given in the introduction illustrates
very well this point.
Therefore, we also deﬁne the “strategic” policy which no longer assumes
that ﬁrm 1 takes other ﬁrms’ prices as given. In this case, ﬁrm 1 will choose
an optimal pricing policy taking into account that its price decisions will aﬀect
other ﬁrms’ prices, which in turn will also aﬀect its own demand. The advantage
of this method is that it is more general and does not rely on the assumption of
perfect competition. However, in order to compute this strategy, we will need
a large amount of data about other ﬁrms price history.
2.1 “Myopic” Policy
We assume that the main objective of ﬁrm 1 is to maximize the present value
of its proﬁts. To simplify our problem, we limit the time horizon to a ﬁnite
number of T periods. Prices of the other competitors are assumed to be constant
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Where δ is the discount rate, Q(.) is the demand function, which depends
3on ﬁrm’s 1 price at time t, P1




t represents unitary cost from ﬁrm 1.
One can argue that the theoretical model described in P1 is unrealistic for
three main reasons. First, ﬁrm 1 does not observe directly its demand function.
Second, market is dynamic and the demand curve will not be a stable function
across time. Third, companies choose pricing policies recursively; at each period
they choose only the price for the next period instead of determining the whole
sequence of future prices.
In order to overcome this criticism, we suggest an modiﬁed version of problem
( P 1 ) .W ea s s u m et h a tﬁrm 1 will estimate its demand function using all available
market information. Thus, Q will be replaced by an estimated function from
available data, denoted by ˆ Q.S e c o n d ,s i n c eﬁrm 1 will use estimated values for
Q, in each period new data arrives and those estimates can be improved. This
means that the demand curve will be a function of time and will be updated each
period; we use then the notation ˆ Qt to represent this time-dependent estimated
demand function. Finally, we will model the optimal strategy used by ﬁrm 1
in a recursive way: in each period, ﬁrm 1 will choose its next period price and
postpone the remaining sequence of prices for the future. In the next period,
ﬁrm 1 updates information about demand estimates and competitors’ prices in
order to choose next period prices. Those assumptions are summarized in the
algorithm below:
“Myopic” algorithm
Step1:At each time s<T , s =1 ,2,...,T, ﬁrm 1 estimates the demand
curve parameters using available data up to s−1, thus obtaining the estimated
function:




Where Ψs,Φs are additional sets of control variables used in the estimation
realized in (1).
In the “myopic” case, ﬁrm 1 will assume no price changes from its competi-




s−1 j =2 ,...,N (2)
Step 2:ﬁrm 1 will chose optimal pricing for period s, P1
s ,w h e r eP1
s is the
ﬁrst element of the price sequence {P1
s+j}T
j=0 that solves:
1A more general hypothesis is to assume that ﬁr m1w i l le x p e c tt h a tc o m p e t i t o r sp r i c e s




s−1),w h e r eEs(.) denotes expected value conditioned
on information available at time s. Although this approach is more general it also would imply
in an stochastic problem instead of a deterministic one. Assuming that our hypothesis in
equation (2) has the same intuition of expecting no price changes, for the sake of simplicity,






















Step 3:If time s +1≤ T return to step 1,o t h e r w i s es t o p .
2.2 “Strategic” Policy
We start from a similar problem as described in P1; however, we no longer
assume competitors’ price as given. Instead, we assume that each ﬁrm k will
change prices is response to past price changes of all ﬁrms, including its own































t−1), k =2 ,...,N,
denote competitors’ pricing policy in response to past price changes of the entire
market. We impose no restrictions on the coeﬃcients of the reaction functions,
we simply attempt to recover competitors’ pattern of reaction form market data.
We use ﬁrst diﬀerences in order to avoid problems with unit roots.
It is immediate to have the same criticism made with regard to P1 for P2 also.
Therefore we will assume that ﬁrm 1 uses estimated functions from available
data for Q and R and will update them periodically. The algorithm also implies
a recursive strategy and it is described below.
“Strategic” algorithm
Step1:At each time s<T , s =1 ,2,...,T , ﬁrm 1 estimates the demand
curve parameters using available data up to s−1, thus obtaining the estimated
function:









s−1;Φs) k =2 ,...,N (4)
5where Ψs,Φs are additional sets of control variables used in the estimation
realized of (3) and (4).
Step 2:ﬁrm 1 will chose optimal pricing for period s, P1
s ,w h e r eP1
s is the

























Step 3:If time s +1≤ T return to step 1,o t h e r w i s es t o p .
Notice that, for both strategies, step 2 indicates that, at each time t, ﬁrm
1 will pick just the ﬁrst price of the optimal pricing sequence {P1
t+j}T
j=0. The
reason for this is that ﬁrm 1 will always update information about the demand
and “strategic” curves and use it in the problems described in MP and RP.
3 Empirical Estimates: A Case Study on the
Insurance Industry
In order to apply our model, we collect data from the auto insurance industry
in Brazil. Basically, we estimated demand and reaction functions from a set of
ﬁrms in this industry and then apply the “myopic” and “strategic” policies for
ag i v e nﬁrm.
Before we present our methodology, it would be useful for the reader to have
some information about this industry. In Brazil, the auto insurance industry
observes a high level of competition among ﬁrms. Insurance companies usually
work with very low margins and most of their proﬁt comes from the ﬁnancial
margins of the collected premiums, prices paid by costumers for the policies.
Prices change very dynamically; each month, ﬁrms review their pricing poli-
cies and deﬁne a new set of prices for each product. Notice that in the insurance
business each diﬀerent product is deﬁned by the combination of the car model,
year of production and location of use. The reason for this is that those three
variables explain most diﬀerences in expected loss value, namely, the expected
loss times the probability of loss.
Because it is very competitive and prices are very volatile over time, the auto
insurance industry presents itself as a natural candidate to gauge our strategic
model. To do that, our ﬁrst hurdle is to select a benchmark ﬁrm, to estimate
its demand function and also estimate reaction functions for the whole industry.
This is what we perform in this section. In the following subsections, we discuss
the data, estimation methodology and results for demand and reaction functions.
63.1 Data
T h et w oc a s e st h a tw es t u d yr e ﬂect the same car model and year but involve
two diﬀerent locations in Brazil. Our selection was based on data availability
and high volume markets, capturing a more dynamic competitive environment.
Together with the pricing policy of ﬁrm 1, we selected four major competitors
which corresponds to more than 80% of the market.
Firm 1 has information only about its own demand and prices and observes
only competitors prices, instead of competitors’ demand. Our data have a panel
structure (e.g. Wooldridge, 2002), in which ﬁrm 1 demand and the insurance
prices and competitors’ insurance prices were monthly recorded for almost three
years.
The data are organized in delimited groups deﬁn e db yr e g i o na n dc a rm o d -
els that have similar characteristics regarding brand, engine power, geographic
region and market price. Each element within a group therefore involves a spe-
ciﬁc model, in a particular region, at a given time. We will call each group
an auto-group which we denominated auto 01 and auto 02. The models were
adjusted independently for each auto group.
3.2 Demand Curves
Total demand was split into two parcels. The ﬁrst one, which we refer as the
“external demand”, is related to policies sold to new customers and the other,
which we name the “internal demand”, considers only policies that were renewed
by current customers. Each parcel was modelled separately within a auto-group.
Information regarding market prices of the cars and the loss ratio2 were used as
instrumental variables whenever necessary.
We overcame the problem of identiﬁcation by assuming that ﬁrms will attend
any demand to a given determined price, which is appropriate in our industry
context. For the sake of simplicity, we will focus our study only on the “external
demand” estimates and we will refer to it simply as demand3.
For the demand function, two models were constructed. The ﬁrst model is
linear and is given by:
QE
it = α + β
1P1
it + ···+ β
5P5
it + Gi + Mt +  it, (D1)
in which, QE
it is the demand of the ﬁrst company at time t for element i of
ag i v e nauto group, P
j
it is the price (deﬂated to the ﬁrst month level) of the
insurance policy for the element i at time t, Gi is the ﬁxed eﬀect of element i,
Mt is the eﬀect of the month of the year,  it is the random error and α, β
1,...,
β
5 are other parameters of the model.
Despite the simplicity of the model described in D1, it resulted in a poor in-
sample ﬁt. One of the possible reasons is that demand data had small variability
2In the insurance industry, the loss ratio is calculated as value paid in indenizations divided
by the total revenue.
3Previous analyses indicated that the “internal demand” is very inelastic, thus, ignoring it
from our subsequent computation should not be problematic.
7and assumed values close to zero or even zero at some months. This fact led to
negative predictions of the demand, what suggested the inadequacy of the linear
model. To avoid this problem, we adopt a second speciﬁcation which uses an
exponential quasi-likelihood model with variance function similar to a negative










it + ···+ β
5P5
it + Gi + Mt
ª
(D2)
with elements as deﬁn e di n( D 1 ) .
Table 1 shows demand estimates of model D2 for two auto-groups,d e ﬁned as
auto 01 and auto 02 for ﬁrm 1. Since our price decision algorithms assume that
demand estimates are updated each period ﬁrm 1 has to take a price decision,
we present the whole set of estimates with data up to one period behind. In each
estimate, we had observed negative elasticities to ﬁrm 1 own price as expected.
However, in both cases, cross-elasticities present negative and positive signs,
although only non negative coeﬃcients should be expected, given that policies
from diﬀerent competitors are assumed to be substitute products.
3.3 Reaction curves
The aim of the reaction curves is to predict the price variation of a company
based on the prices variations of the other competitors. As we have ﬁve compa-
nies involved in the problem, we have to estimate a set of ﬁve models, one for
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6 are parameters and Gi and Mt are as deﬁned in the last section.
Due to technical limitations, each model was estimated independently from
the others. We used the estimation procedure proposed by Arellano (2003)
for dynamic panel data. Tables 2 and 3 present reaction curves estimates for
auto 01 and auto 02.5 Like we did for the demand functions, we present seven
diﬀerent estimations that increase the sample size recursively as speciﬁed in the
algorithms from section 2.
Tables 2 and 3 show the complexity of relationships among many ﬁrms re-
acting to its own price changes and four other ﬁrms price changes. In order to
get some intuition behind those results, we deﬁne some reaction strategies that
one ﬁrm can pursue. First, let us deﬁne strategies that one ﬁrm can follow with
respect to its own price:
4For ﬁrm 1, estimation of equation R1 was just to investigate its reaction pattern against
its competitors, this estimation is not necessary for the application of the algorithms described
in section 2.
5In those tables we include also ﬁrm 1, althought the algorithm will assume that ﬁrm 1
will no longer use that strategy.
8Deﬁnition 2 (Inertial Strategy) A ﬁrm is considered inertial with respect
to its own price if current increases (decreases) in price are preceded by past
increases (decreases) in its own price. In other words, if its reaction coeﬃcient
to its own past price changes is signiﬁcantly positive.
Deﬁnition 3 (Cyclical Strategy) A ﬁrm is considered cyclical with respect
to its own price if current increases (decreases) in price are preceded by past
decreases (increases) in its own price. In other words, if its reaction coeﬃcient
to its own past price changes is signiﬁcantly negative.
Those two deﬁnitions present two diﬀerent strategic patterns. In the case of
the inertial ﬁrm, increasing (decreasing) price in the past means that the ﬁrm
will continue to increase (decrease) prices in the present. A ﬁrm is said to have
a cyclical strategy if it oscillates back and forth by increasing and decreasing
prices.
We also deﬁne some reaction strategies of one ﬁrm with respect to other
ﬁrms, it can follow, anti-follow or ignore the other ﬁrm.
Deﬁnition 4 (Follow Strategy) A ﬁr mAi ss a i dt of o l l o wﬁr mBi fi ti n -
creases (decreases) its price after ﬁrm B price increases (decreases) its price.
In other words, if its reaction coeﬃcient to its own past price changes is nega-
tive. In other words, if its reaction coeﬃcient to ﬁrm B past price changes is
signiﬁcantly positive.
Deﬁnition 5 (Anti-follow Strategy) A ﬁrm A is said to anti-follows ﬁrm B
if it increases (decreases) its price after ﬁrm B price decreases (increases) its
price. In other words, if its reaction coeﬃcient to ﬁrm B past price changes is
signiﬁcantly negative.
Deﬁnition 6 (Ignore Strategy) A ﬁrm A is said to ignore ﬁr mBi fi tn e i t h e r
f o l l o w so rc o m p e t e sw i t hﬁrm B.
Tables 4 and 5 describes the strategies found to each ﬁrm in each auto group6.
Some stylized facts can be concluded from the results: First, in general each
ﬁrm presents an inertial strategy with respect to its own price. Second, ﬁrms in
general choose one or at most two ﬁrms to follow and also one or at most two
ﬁrms to anti-follow. One possible interpretation is that one ﬁrm follows another
ﬁrm trying to replicate the same price policy strategy and keeping its relative
market share constant to that other ﬁrm. In contrast, a anti-follow strategy
means that one ﬁrm goes in the opposite direction, increasing prices when the
other ﬁrm decreases its price and decreasing prices when the other ﬁrm increases
prices, possibly, this strategy intends to get market share from the other ﬁrm.
Third, reaction strategies can be used to induce the market to follow your
strategy, for example, in auto 01 ﬁrm 1 is followed by ﬁrms 2 and 4 , and ﬁrms 3
6We used an arbitrary criteria of considering a ﬁrm in one determined strategy if its
reaction fucntion coeﬃcient is statiscally signiﬁcant at 90% or above conﬁdence level in 5 or
more regressions out of 7.
9and 5 follows ﬁrm 2. Therefore, ﬁrm 1 can make all ﬁrms to follow its strategy
by leading 2 and 4 directly and 3 and 5 indirectly through ﬁrm 2.
Those analysis, although intuitive are not enough to deﬁne an speciﬁco p -
timization strategy, since we have to consider reactions in direct and indirect
order and also look at the magnitude of those reactions and their speciﬁcd e -
mand elasticities. In order to do such complex task we use a numerical method
which is presented in the next section.
3.4 Does it pay to anticipate?
Our approach is to apply the algorithm described in section 2 using demand
and reaction estimates of section 3. The numerical results were obtained by a
software with programing in Matlab 6.5. We use the mathematical model for
demand with binomial negative ﬁt of parameters described in equation D2 and
reaction functions estimated by equation (R1) . The solution for the optimiza-
tion problems described in the “myopic” and “strategic” algorithms are obtained
from Matlab software using fmincon.m code. This code use the Nelder-Mead
algorithm7 for search the optimal point for maximum or minimum of functions.
The computer program was made in Matlab version 6.5.
A sensible gain in expected proﬁts by pursuing a “strategic” policy instead of
a “myopic” policy is interpreted as the gain of anticipating competitor reactions.
Table 6 presents the results and shows that, at least for the two cases we studied,
it does pay to anticipate competitor reactions. The expected gain in auto 01
is an increase of 26%, while the expected gain in auto 02 is an increase of 10%
in proﬁts. Those expected gains can be considered relevant for an industry
t h a tw o r k sw i t hv e r yl o wm a r g i n sa n dd e p e n d so nﬁnancial gains on collected
premiums to attain positive margins.
Figures 1 and 2 gives a better intuition of a “strategic” policy. In the case of
auto 01 (ﬁgure 1), ﬁrm 1 strategy is to increase prices by an average of 40% from
period three to nine8. It makes all the other ﬁrms to increase average prices
also; thus, ﬁrms 2, 3, 4 and 5 increase prices on average by 19%, 5%, 18% and
12% respectively. We can draw two results form this: First, ﬁrm 1 strategy to
7The Nelder-Mead method is a simplex method for ﬁnding a local minimum of a function
of several variables. For two variables, a simplex is a triangle, and the method is a pattern
search that compares function values at the three vertices of a triangle. The worst vertex,
where is largest, is rejected and replaced with a new vertex. A new triangle is formed and the
search is continued. The process generates a sequence of triangles (which might have diﬀerent
shapes), for which the function values at the vertices get smaller and smaller. The size of the
triangles is reduced and the coordinates of the minimum point are found.
The algorithm is stated using the term simplex (a generalized triangle in n dimensions)
and will ﬁnd the minimum of a function of n variables. It is eﬀective and computationally
compact. For a function of n variables, the algorithm maintains a set of n+1 points forming
the vertices of a simplex or polytope in n-dimensional space. This simplex is successively
updated at each iteration by discarding the vertex having the highest function value and
replacing it with a new vertex having a lower function value. Such direct search methods have
the advantage of requiring no derivative computations (indeed, the objective function need
not even be smooth), but they tend to be eﬃcient only in relatively low dimensions.
8Firms start to maximize from period 3 to 9 and period 1 and give the initial conditions
for our algorithm.
10maximize proﬁts is to increase prices to explore its demand elasticity. Second,
this increase in prices can be higher when ﬁrm 1 anticipates competitor reactions
since they will follow this price increase, that is, there is a “reverse price war”
eﬀect.
The opposite strategy is presented in auto 02. In this case (ﬁgure 2), ﬁrm 1
decreases prices from period three to nine on an average of 12%. This decrease
in prices is not followed by a price war since the other ﬁrms change prices very
slightly; thus ﬁrms 2, 3, 4 and 5 change prices on average by respectively -4%,
2%, -3% and -3%. In this case, cutting prices gives a better proﬁt because the
strategy explore the demand elasticity and did not triggered a price war.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we showed that considering competitor reactions can play a major
role in maximizing proﬁts. We studied two groups of insurance policies, called
auto-groups, in the auto insurance industry in Brazil and estimated a demand
curve for the reference ﬁrm and reaction functions for its major competitors.
One of the main results was to show that a “strategic” policy will explore
both its estimated demand elasticities and the expected pricing policy followed
by its competitors. When an optimal “strategic” policy involves price increases
it will induce competitors to increase prices also in some kind of reverse price
war. If the optimal “strategic” policy involves a decrease in prices, it can avoid
a price war looking at expected competitors’ pricing dynamics as dictated by
their estimated reaction curves.
The main question is when and how to make the price changes. For this, it
is crucial to compute demand elasticities, reaction functions coeﬃcients and nu-
merically compute strategies. Our main contributions was to describe a method-
ology to do that empirically and compositionally. At the end, the answer to the
question posed in the title is yes, it does pays to anticipate competitors moves
and to use this information strategically.
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TABLE 1 - DEMAND ESTIMATES FOR AG 01 AND AG 02
Sample from: Aug-02 Aug-02 Aug-02 Aug-02 Aug-02 Aug-02 Aug-02
to: May-05 Apr-05 Mar-05 Feb-05 Jan-05 Dec-04 Nov-04
s=1 s=2 s=3 s=4 s=5 s=6 s=7=T
Constant 4,3106 *** 4,3689 *** 4,5471 *** 5,2134 *** 5,6401 *** 5,7435 *** 5,7007 ***
Firm_1 -0,0024 *** -0,0022 *** -0,0017 * -0,0014 * -0,0016 * -0,0014 * -0,0012 *
Firm_2 0,0005 * 0,0003 * -0,0003 * -0,0012 * -0,0022 * -0,0025 * -0,0023 *
Firm_3 0,0008 * 0,0009 * 0,0010 * 0,0009 * 0,0008 * 0,0007 * 0,0005 *
Firm_4 -0,0032 *** -0,0035 *** -0,0042 *** -0,0052 *** -0,0051 *** -0,0052 *** -0,0052 ***
Firm_5 -0,0005 * -0,0003 * 0,0002 * 0,0012 * 0,0019 * 0,0022 * 0,0019 **
R
2
0.082339 0.077256 0.071233 0.062354 0.068823 0.068864 0.074948
Sample from: Aug-02 Aug-02 Aug-02 Aug-02 Aug-02 Aug-02 Aug-02
to: May-05 Apr-05 Mar-05 Feb-05 Jan-05 Dec-04 Nov-04
s=1 s=2 s=3 s=4 s=5 s=6 s=7=T
Constant 1,9686 *** 2,0651 *** 2,4281 *** 3,3427 *** 3,8355 *** 4,4833 *** 4,7627 ***
Firm_1 -0,0033 *** -0,0032 *** -0,0034 *** -0,0037 *** -0,0043 *** -0,0049 *** -0,0051 ***
Firm_2 0,0011 * 0,0011 * 0,0006 * -0,0005 * 0,0001 * -0,0003 * -0,0006 *
Firm_3 0,0006 * 0,0005 * 0,0003 * -0,0004 * -0,0003 * -0,0005 * -0,0006 *
Firm_4 0,0007 * 0,0006 * 0,0004 * 0,0000 * -0,0003 * -0,0003 * -0,0003 *
Firm_5 -0,0013 * -0,0012 * -0,0004 * 0,0015 * 0,0012 * 0,0019 * 0,0023 *
R
2
0.030982 0.030296 0.033890 0.044019 0.046021 0.048490 0.052706
Obs.: ***, **, * indicates that the parameter is statistically significant respectivally to 99%, 95% and 90% confidence level 
AG 01 - Demand Curves
AG 02 - Demand Curves  14 
TABLE 2 - REACTION ESTIMATES FOR AG 01
Sample from: Aug-02 Aug-02 Aug-02 Aug-02 Aug-02 Aug-02 Aug-02





s=1 s=2 s=3 s=4 s=5 s=6 s=7=T
Firm_1 0,867958 *** 0,902436 *** 1,012959 *** 0,751135 *** 0,819385 *** 0,770367 *** 0,626605 ***
Firm_2 0,264024 ** 0,032813  0,053884  0,191000 ** -0,031092   -0,012640  0,074031  
Firm_3 -0,130533   -0,076757   -0,081255  0,076342  0,250131  0,191207  0,003478  
Firm_4 -0,153530 * -0,110862 * -0,104322  -0,060365   0,097718   0,080075  -0,093136  
Firm_5 -0,268629 *** -0,152631 *** -0,153675 *** -0,156813 *** -0,096987 *** -0,086062 *** -0,079918 **
Firm_1 0,569764 *** 0,558398 *** 0,552151 *** 0,435328 ** 0,397259 ** 0,369076 *** 0,279528  
Firm_2 0,350795 *** 0,662070 *** 0,618816 *** 0,761299 *** 0,744569 *** 0,651796 *** 0,812985 ***
Firm_3 0,041421  -0,049225  -0,023499  -0,011543   0,069415   0,013755  -0,000836  
Firm_4 -0,063926  -0,108394 ** -0,167204 ** -0,197542 *** -0,188825 *** -0,183476 *** -0,107482  
Firm_5 -0,061104 ** -0,166041 *** -0,108440 ** -0,096075 ** -0,071231 ** -0,032755  -0,080783 **
Firm_1 0,460285 *** 0,677824 *** 0,338038 ** 0,204122  0,295713  0,331679 ** -0,111647  
Firm_2 -0,271768 ** -0,392897 *** -0,294193 ** -0,302451 ** -0,473039 *** -0,553945 *** -0,138718  
Firm_3 0,300517 *** 0,207015 *** 0,343496  0,339227 *** 0,318771 *** 0,269067  0,336290 ***
Firm_4 0,274653 ** 0,287778 *** 0,349861 *** 0,347049 *** 0,377595 *** 0,453365 *** 0,382351  
Firm_5 -0,147640 *** -0,101445 *** -0,072965 *** -0,017287  0,040235  0,033468   -0,079800 ***
Firm_1 0,669084 *** 0,714150 *** 0,674113 *** 0,659604 *** 0,738260 ** 0,601674 *** 0,433624  
Firm_2 0,100049  0,090654  0,321625   -0,148214  0,217435  0,013464  0,340663  
Firm_3 0,059834  0,073793  0,110944  0,024708  0,306635  0,170806  0,381956  
Firm_4 0,202415 *** 0,196531 ** 0,131465  0,059091  0,093273  0,152187  0,278761  
Firm_5 -0,172430 *** -0,181000 *** -0,184854  -0,044380  -0,078616  -0,020018  -0,181266 **
Firm_1 -0,158486 ** -0,245738 *** -0,091625  -0,072741  -0,078108  -0,091492  -0,118414  
Firm_2 0,265707  0,652804 ** 0,951966 *** 1,013608 *** 0,914467 *** 1,033676 *** 0,882455 ***
Firm_3 -0,080348  -0,079099  -0,112163  -0,116545 ** -0,131201 *** -0,195735  -0,219415  
Firm_4 -0,207465 ** -0,449118 *** -0,303733 ** -0,288875 ** -0,182364 ** -0,206435 ** -0,107645  
Firm_5 -0,129154 *** -0,222589 ** -0,358767 *** -0,380102 *** -0,331021 *** -0,419361 *** -0,385003 ***





Firm_4  15 
TABLE 3 - REACTION ESTIMATES FOR AG 02
Sample from: Aug-02 Aug-02 Aug-02 Aug-02 Aug-02 Aug-02 Aug-02





s=1 s=2 s=3 s=4 s=5 s=6 s=7=T
Firm_1 0,665928 *** 0,680796 *** 0,372578 ** 0,246750  0,594397 *** 0,489499 *** 0,186618  
Firm_2 -0,015936  -0,083580 * 0,348179   0,037259  -0,062449   0,025988   0,009651  
Firm_3 0,081869 ** 0,064548 *** 0,299308 * 0,198830 *** 0,004781  0,110397 ** 0,087880  
Firm_4 0,098137 * 0,069974 * 0,215834 ** 0,192447  -0,037551   0,017721  -0,073312 *
Firm_5 -0,633913 *** -0,563566 *** -1,094670 *** -0,698187 *** -0,185821  -0,399733 *** -0,144390  
Firm_1 0,260142 *** 0,400857 * 0,326819 *** 0,056287 *** 0,189089 *** 0,084693 * -0,037049 *
Firm_2 0,469013 * 0,472511 * 0,496224 * 0,252096 * 0,358666 * 0,330229 * 0,163222 *
Firm_3 0,061908 *** 0,113832 * 0,097463 *** -0,016730 *** -0,030688 *** -0,027848 *** 0,016137 *
Firm_4 -0,044968 *** -0,050799 *** -0,079500 *** 0,017163 *** -0,236996 *** -0,181470 *** -0,015356 *
Firm_5 0,161089 *** 0,194614 *** 0,266141 *** 0,175990 *** 0,489931 * 0,418332 * 0,249701 **
Firm_1 -0,282686 *** 0,016843 *** -0,154699 *** -0,145167 *** -0,255239 *** -0,692436 * -0,584677 *
Firm_2 0,077940 *** -0,053765 *** 0,044788 *** 0,008392 *** 0,158907 *** 0,108096 *** 0,042723 *
Firm_3 0,545073 * 0,440055 * 0,508052 * 0,486238 * 0,576756 * 0,643615 * 0,565125 ***
Firm_4 0,034617 *** 0,275617 *** 0,444315 * 0,294396 *** 0,393693 *** 0,391203 ** 0,345512 ***
Firm_5 -0,121720 *** 0,113542 *** -0,253381 *** -0,058848 *** -0,473900 *** -0,448797 * -0,333138 **
Firm_1 0,325729 * 0,222554 * 0,235337 * 0,229864 * 0,268918 * 0,264871 * 0,278332 *
Firm_2 0,320713 * 0,448334 * 0,127740 *** 0,263738 ** 0,158847 ** 0,191895 * -0,102380 ***
Firm_3 -0,077180 *** 0,028768 *** -0,129878 *** 0,043266 *** -0,213658 * -0,193804 * -0,332927 *
Firm_4 0,760177 * 0,892102 * 0,870245 * 1,099782 * 0,522838 * 0,521371 * 0,826247 *
Firm_5 -0,714820 * -0,921821 * -0,442227 * -0,629774 *** 0,059135 *** 0,023547 *** 0,122430 ***
Firm_1 -0,058762 *** 0,139798 *** 0,142886 *** 0,119085 *** 0,180870 *** 0,152350 * 0,285851 *
Firm_2 -0,026591 *** 0,096512 *** 0,095375 *** -0,012633 *** -0,054437 *** -0,068803 *** 0,009685 ***
Firm_3 0,053111 *** 0,046459 *** 0,046796 *** -0,024129 *** -0,055945 *** -0,025030 *** -0,006522 ***
Firm_4 0,021286 *** -0,237635 *** -0,206684 *** -0,198084 *** -0,243277 * -0,009657 *** -0,164327 ***
Firm_5 0,618489 * 0,894111 * 0,886655 * 0,926533 * 1,025519 * 0,782660 * 0,856931 *
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Firm_1 7 0 0 0 Inertial
Firm_2 2 3 0 2 Ignores
Firm_3 0 4 0 3 Ignores
Firm_4 0 2 2 3 Ignores
Firm_5 0 0 7 0 Anti-follows
Firm_1 6 1 0 0 Follows
Firm_2 7 0 0 0 Inertial
Firm_3 0 3 0 4 Ignores
Firm_4 0 0 5 2 Anti-follows
Firm_5 0 0 6 1 Anti-follows
Firm_1 4 2 0 1 Ignores
Firm_2 0 0 6 1 Anti-follows
Firm_3 5 2 0 0 Inertial
Firm_4 6 1 0 0 Follows
Firm_5 0 2 4 1 Ignores
Firm_1 6 1 0 0 Follows
Firm_2 0 6 0 1 Ignores
Firm_3 0 7 0 0 Ignores
Firm_4 2 5 0 0 No pattern
Firm_5 0 0 3 4 Ignores
Firm_1 0 0 2 5 Ignores
Firm_2 6 1 0 0 Follows
Firm_3 0 0 2 5 Ignores
Firm_4 0 0 6 1 Anti-follows





Own Price: Inertial   




Own Price: Inertial   
Follows: 1                    
Anti-follows: 4 and 5
Own Price: Inertial   
Follows: 4                        
Anti-follows: 2
Own price: No pattern   
Follows: 1 
Own Price: Cyclical   
Follows: 2                         
Anti-follows: 4
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# of pos & sig. # of pos & no sig # of neg & sig.
# of neg & no 
sig.
Strategy Strategy 
Firm_1 5 2 0 0 Inertial
Firm_2 0 4 1 2 Ignores
Firm_3 5 2 0 0 Follows
Firm_4 3 2 1 1 Ignores
Firm_5 0 0 5 2 Anti-follows
Firm_1 6 0 1 0 Follows
Firm_2 7 0 0 0 Inertial
Firm_3 4 0 3 0 Ignores
Firm_4 1 0 6 0 Anti-follows
Firm_5 7 0 0 0 Follows
Firm_1 1 0 6 0 Anti-follows
Firm_2 6 0 1 0 Follows
Firm_3 7 0 0 0 Inertial
Firm_4 7 0 0 0 Follows
Firm_5 1 0 6 0 Anti-follows
Firm_1 7 0 0 0 Follows
Firm_2 6 0 1 0 Follows
Firm_3 2 0 5 0 Anti-follows
Firm_4 7 0 0 0 Inertial
Firm_5 3 0 4 0 Ignores
Firm_1 6 0 1 0 Follows
Firm_2 3 0 4 0 Ignores
Firm_3 3 0 4 0 Ignores
Firm_4 1 0 6 0 Anti-follows





Own Price: Inertial   




Own Price: Inertial    
Follows: 1 and 5         
Anti-follows: 4
Own Price: Inertial    
Follows: 2 and 3         
Anti-follows: 5
Own Price: Inertial    
Follows: 1 and 2         
Anti-follows: 3
Own Price: Inertial    
Follows: 1                   
Anti-follows: 4
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Table 6 - Comparative expected profits Myopic vs. Reaction Strategies
Myopic Strategy* Reaction Strategy Gain to anticipate 
reactions (% of profits)
Does it pay to 
anticipate?
AG 01 100 126 26% YES
AG 02 100 110 10% YES
* Profits normalized to 100    19 
FIGURE 01 – Actual and Reaction strategies AG 01 
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F1 - Reaction F5 - Reaction F1 - Actual F5 - Actual  20 
FIGURE 02 – Actual and Reaction strategies AG 02 
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